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It’s About the Group, Not God: Social Causes and Cures for Terrorism 
 





This essay challenges assumptions about the root causes of jihadist terrorism that prioritize 
political, religious, or economic factors. Drawing on the author’s anecdotal experience 
interviewing hundreds of accused jihadist terrorists, along with survey data collected from 
subject matter experts in countering violent extremism (CVE), the essay offers an 
interpretation for terrorism’s causes and cures that emphasizes social factors. Contrary to 
narratives popular in the U.S. – both in media and government circles – the lure of terrorism 
is not a result of political marginalization, economic disadvantage, or even religious 
indoctrination. It is foremost a sociological phenomenon, created by individuals who seek 
the insulating security of group identity and affiliation. The real reason why people are 
drawn to join terrorist groups is the innate need for camaraderie, identity, and a sense of 
belonging – the pursuit of social satisfaction, not the expression of political or economic 
frustration, much less the fulfilment of a religious imperative. CVE research that exclusively 
focuses on the political, economic, or religious causes of terrorism will, at best, over-appraise 
their significance, and, at worst, distract policymakers from understanding more influential 
motivators and responding to them accordingly. New directions for research lie in further 
exploring the sociological underpinnings of jihadist terrorism, as well as validating the 
effectiveness of social-centred CVE policies already in place. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Charles Mink is a PhD Candidate at the University of Arizona in the Middle Eastern Studies 
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Introduction 
 
 The premise of countering violent extremism (CVE) is to defeat terrorism at its roots 
by offering a precise understanding of terrorist motivations and predicting how those 
motivations practically manifest into terrorist violence. Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes 
of the George Washington University’s “Program on Extremism” offer a good working 
definition of CVE that may be informative here: “In substance,” they write, “CVE 
constitutes an array of non-repressive initiatives that seek to address behaviours that could 
potentially lead to terrorism...”1 
In recent years, CVE has become an avant-garde academic discipline with an array 
of defenders and detractors.2 
In the relatively demobilized Obama era, CVE has actually stolen some thunder 
from the military interventionist camp. U.S.-led regime change, nation-building, and 
counterinsurgency operations have been largely supplanted by scholarly meditations on 
terrorism’s root causes, conferences designed to bridge the worlds of academia and policy, 
and diplomatic pressure on pertinent allies to take a more holistic approach to their own 
counterterrorism policies and procedures.3 
To its credit, the Obama administration has opened new avenues for applying CVE 
research in the U.S., and new empirical conclusions about terrorist motivations are finding 
inroads to inform policy.4 Countering those motivations, it stands to reason, should be easier 
now with over a decade of hindsight looking at what drove terrorists to join and/or support 
their respective groups. Since 9/11, more professionals from the intelligence community, 
law enforcement, and academia have actually interacted with terrorists directly, and thus 
public discourse on terrorism’s underlying and sustaining causes should start to reflect a 
more authentic narrative.5 
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report with a negligible effect on policy. Since 9/11, public discourse on terrorism’s 
underlying causes has clung to premises of politics, economics, and religion. To counter 
terrorism’s appeal, U.S. officials have expressed a need to eliminate a hazy combination of 
political disaffection, economic marginalization, and intolerant religious ideology. Officials 
have sought to deter a generation of would-be terrorists by changing authoritarian regimes 
into democracies, by opening commercial markets, and by pressuring religiously-
conservative allies like Saudi Arabia to openly promote religious freedom and tolerance.6  
Consider the following excerpts from President Bush between 2002 and 2006, 
speaking on his administration’s strategy to fight extremism in the Middle East: 
 
“Ultimately, the only way to defeat the terrorists is to defeat their dark vision 
of hatred and fear by offering the hopeful alternative of political freedom…”7 
 
“Democracy and reform will make [Middle Eastern states] stronger and more 
stable, and make the world more secure by undermining terrorism at its 
source… If that region grows in democracy and prosperity and hope, the 
terrorist movement will lose its sponsors, lose its recruits, and lose the 
festering grievances that keep terrorists in business.”8 
 
“We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free 
markets, and free trade to every corner of the world. The events of [9/11] 
taught us that… poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak 
states vulnerable to terrorist networks…”9 
 
“We will challenge the poverty and hopelessness and lack of education and 
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and try to turn to their advantage.”10 
 
“The terrorism we confront today springs from: Political alienation… 
grievances that can be blamed on others… Subcultures of conspiracy… [and] 
an ideology that justifies murder…”11 
 
While President Obama, for his part, has been spuriously criticized for “refusing to call it 
‘Islamic terrorism’,”12 the political-economic explanation for terrorism still holds sway 
within his administration. Obama has spoken about the root causes of terrorism many times, 
most personally in May 2013, when he attributed terrorism’s popularity to issues of poverty, 
sectarianism, political repression, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.13 His administration’s 2015 
National Security Strategy (NSS) details a plan to “to address the underlying conditions 
that can help foster violent extremism such as poverty, inequality, and repression,” for 
which the NSS goes on to prescribe “greater economic opportunities for women and 
disaffected youth” as the solution.14  
In October 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry said what is needed to counter 
extremism are “better alternatives for a whole bunch of young people who today live in 
places where they feel oppressed… [and where] they don’t have jobs.”15 Kerry has said that 
the solution to terrorism is “economic opportunity for marginalized youth,”16 and he has 
gone on record to blame the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria on poverty.17 In short, despite 
more than a decade of analytical experience in the War on Terror, the Obama 
administration seems to understand the root causes of terrorism in much the same way the 
Bush administration did. Politics and economics still carry the day. 
For its part, the Fourth Estate is often just as complicit in over-estimating political, 
economic, and religious explanations for terrorist violence. Many journalists who have 
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editorials published by mainstream U.S. news outlets, for example, consistently emphasize 
economic marginalization, political resentment, and Wahhabi indoctrination as reasons for 
ISIL’s appeal. Preferred points of emphasis are poverty and unemployment, perceived anti-
Muslim policies, and Saudi-financed proselytizing campaigns aimed at Muslim minorities in 
various Western countries.18  
These points of emphasis by the media continue to portray economic, political, and 
religious agitation as likely tipping points – prerequisites even – in a budding terrorist’s 
radicalization process. In turn, these points of emphasis contribute to an increasingly-
mainstream perspective that Muslims in the West have no chance at economic success, no 
state-guaranteed freedom to practice their religion, no learned tolerance for religious 
pluralism, and thus no choice but to seek a solution to their existential crises in the Islamic 
State.  
 
A Social Alternative 
 
Although rhetorically popular for politicians and journalists of all persuasions, 
fixations on politics, economics, and religion as motivating conditions for terrorism have 
actually obscured the true nature of its appeal and sidetracked policies to counter it. 
Fortunately, however, professional interaction with terrorists themselves is leading to a more 
genuine narrative about why people seek refuge in terrorist groups. Quite simply, more 
people with an agenda to find out have actually asked terrorists themselves why they got 
involved in the first place. Since many intelligence professionals are disinclined to record 
their experiences (and thus unable to document the motivations of their former subjects), it 
is essential that we listen closely to professionals – including those from other fields – who 
have done just that.19 The experts referenced in this essay argue that terrorists actually 
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and large, they contend, getting involved in terrorism is a process of socialization.20  
Psychologist John Horgan argues that terrorist groups are appealing because they 
offer a source of identity to people suffering from a profound, albeit natural identity crisis. 
He suggests that terrorists usually ascribe religious, political, and economic motives for their 
involvement after the fact, in a post hoc attempt to rationalize indefensible acts of violence. 
Why terrorists become involved initially, however, is because they seek meaning through 
group identity and participation.21 
Anthropologist Scott Atran takes a similar position. In Atran’s experience, jihadist 
terrorists are patently ordinary people whose involvement in terrorism can be attributed to 
peer-pressure and a desire to be part of an “in group” of some significance. Specific acts of 
violence – even self-sacrifice – are made easier when an individual feels his or her 
immediate social circle will benefit thereby. Atran portrays terrorist recruitment as a social 
transaction by which a new member might feel indebted to the group for bringing him into 
the fold. In turn, acts of terrorist violence are forms of repayment, aimed at pleasing and 
appeasing fellow members first and foremost. The cover of Atran’s seminal work 
summarizes his position quite well: “Terrorists don’t just kill and die for a cause, they kill 
and die for one another.”22 
Psychiatrist Marc Sageman believes that within the individual terrorist life cycle, 
existing social relationships almost always predate a radicalization phase. Sageman reviewed 
the files of 172 self-styled jihadist terrorists for his 2004 book, and he later advanced his 
thesis by adding that terrorist groups have over time evolved into diffuse, decentralized, and 
relatively egalitarian networks of like-minded peers, whose formation is prompted by the 
shared trauma of their members and whose sustainment is traceable to the camaraderie that 
such a commonality arouses.23 Sageman meticulously refutes the economic thesis, noting 
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As one of very few actual sociologists making the social argument for terrorism’s root 
causes, Stephen Vertigans devotes a good portion of his 2011 book to making the case for 
more such research. Vertigans offers a few additional insights not covered in great depth by 
Horgan, Atran, or Sageman. For example, Vertigans attributes terrorism’s popularity to a 
well-crafted extremist narrative that dichotomizes the world and leaves only “with us” or 
“against us” options. Terrorist groups, Vertigans believes, place high value on trust exercises 
and rituals – practices that formalize membership, engender camaraderie, and raise the costs 
of defection.25  
Why terrorism continues to charm people around the world, according to the 
qualified experts referenced above, is not because those people suffer from political 
frustration, economic disadvantage, or religious indoctrination. They are not, by and large, 
angry, impoverished, or especially pious. They are instead looking to fill their lives with 
companionship and significance. They join terrorist groups because they see affiliation with 
a global phenomenon as the best way to experience intimacy and solidarity with like-
minded people – satisfying a social need more basic than anything that politicians, 
economists, or religious scholars could ever offer.26  
This essay suggests that as long as America’s CVE strategy relies on political, 
economic, and religious solutions to jihadist terrorism, and thus ignores the fundamental 
human need to belong to something important, terrorist groups will continue to be a refuge 
for many people. What follows in the next section is a summary of the author’s anecdotal 
conclusions about the underlying causes and conditions for terrorism. Thereafter, the results 
of research conducted by this author with subject matter experts in the field of countering 
violent extremism are presented and discussed. The essay concludes with the 
recommendation that academic researchers should more rigorously explore the sociological 
underpinnings of terrorism while simultaneously vetting the effectiveness of socially-
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Experience From The Field 
 
My research in countering violent extremism began informally, with an academic 
curiosity that started in the interrogation booth in Iraq. I debriefed hundreds of accused 
terrorists affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI, now ISIS or ISIL) between 2007 and 
2008. Some were justly charged, some only with familial connections to the real suspects, 
but all of the detainees I interrogated reshaped my assumptions about why people joined or 
supported groups that proudly identified as terrorist organizations. I had trained for the 
interrogation job shortly after 9/11, with a near-doctrinal expectation that the people in 
orange jump suits would be poor, uneducated, conservative, and intensely religious. They 
would be political outsiders, economic pariahs, and religious zealots. Terrorism, I suspected, 
would be their outlet for frustration and rage, as well as the fulfilment a profound spiritual 
mandate.  
 As an interrogator with some success, I wish I had aggregated my data at the time. 
Those hundreds of anecdotes, detailing how and why particular individuals joined and 
stayed with the ISI could be useful in my now post hoc effort to understand the true nature 
of terrorism’s prodigious appeal to people across generations. A lack of empirical data 
notwithstanding, I recall unequivocally that very few actually fit the stereotype described 
above.  
Most of my detainees were fairly well educated, completely uninterested in state 
politics, gainfully employed in one way or another, and – perhaps most surprising – they 
were religiously apathetic. Even those detainees who were “assessed” (a trademark 
analytical term) to be a local “sharia enforcer [moral policeman],” for example, almost 
always dispensed with the religious veneer when we were alone in the booth. They dropped 
the formal Arabic, chain-smoked cigarettes, and waxed nostalgic about Saddam. They 
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someday than go on Hajj. They seemed much prouder of the imagined success of their 
group than of the glory such success brought to God. 
By way of employment, so many detained ISI members whom I interviewed were 
independent merchants – car salesmen in particular – that it almost became a comedy in the 
interrogation booth. “Let me guess,” I would sometimes ask pre-emptively, “you buy and sell 
cars for a living?” It was the kind of job that allowed a man to work his own schedule, 
maintain independence, avoid daily interaction with colleagues, and earn a pretty good 
living doing it.  
On state politics, most had no opinion whatsoever. Raised under a dictator most of 
their lives, and, after 2003, in system “of Shi’a political monopoly” (a term I often heard), 
most ISI members simply saw politics as inaccessible and meaningless. By and large, 
however, this fact made them more apathetic than angry.  
On religion, most said they were proud but not devout Muslims. They admitted that 
they tried to pray five times a day but usually missed the dawn prayer and intended to make 
up for it later. They regularly went to the mosque on Fridays, but more so as an obligation 
stemming from community pressure. They described it as an act of routine rather than an 
act of worship, and confessed they feared the social costs of being absent from Friday prayer 
more so than the spiritual costs. 
 No detained terrorist I encountered ever attempted to lecture me on Islam or cite 
religious belief as the reason why he joined the ISI. Many complained about their poor 
economic status in society, as well as about the lacklustre Sunni leadership in the new Iraqi 
government, but none cited these as “last straw” reasons for their involvement in the ISI. 
When it came down to actually joining the group, nearly every detainee I spoke with 
recounted a social phenomenon – “all the Shabab (young people) had joined… Everybody I 
knew had sworn allegiance…”  
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who called the ISI “his Fight Club,” in reference to the 1999 movie starring Brad Pitt. As a 
freelance car salesman, he did not have anywhere particular to be during the day, and he 
apparently liked the idea of moonlighting with like-minded young people to do something 
regimented and, in their minds, meaningful. I recall nearly every military-age male detainee 
from Fallujah and Ramadi telling me that they wanted to fight for their country at first, but 
the Iraqi Army – by then seen as an exclusive Shi’a organization – was not an option for 
Sunni boys from Anbar.  
Even the leadership ranks told a similar tale – “I met an influential man in prison… 
We used to work together under Saddam… We rekindled a strong relationship… We 
decided to work together after getting released.”27 Across the ranks, joining the ISI was a 
product of socializing with others who were themselves somehow already involved. 
In the interrogation booth, most detainees followed a fairly predictable emotional 
trajectory. The first concern was their family. “Were they okay?” “Who else was arrested?” 
– these were usually their first questions, understandable in light of the fact that I usually 
spoke with detainees shortly after their capture (itself a tumultuous experience). But when 
visceral emotions waned and detainees began to realize the permanence of their situation, 
cooperative detainees attempted to probe for information about their brothers-in-arms. They 
wanted to know who else has been detained, who has been released, who is in whose 
custody, in which prison, and how quickly they too could join general population and 
interact with their comrades.28 
With varying degrees of cunning, my detainees attempted to find out which of their 
comrades had “talked” and which had not. One reason, admittedly, was to narrow down 
who might be to blame for their own detention, but more commonly, I sensed that they 
wanted to test my commitment to discretion – “If I cooperate and reveal the boss’s location, 
will he know it was me who gave him up?” The final hurdle in gaining cooperation, in other 
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him for cooperating. Once my detainees came to believe their own social standing in the 
organization would not suffer for their cooperation, their most pressing inhibition usually 
disappeared. Significantly, cooperative detainees seemed relatively unconcerned with the 
political, economic, or spiritual repercussions that might result from “helping” the enemy.  
Overall, it struck me that very few ISI members in Iraq had joined the group because 
they resented the Shia-led government, or because they needed a well-paying job, or 
because they believed killing infidels was a religious mandate. They did it, at least in their 
minds, because they saw anti-Western terrorism as their zeitgeist – an epic social 
phenomenon that they felt defined their time and place in the world, and which produced 
such an intense and regenerative gravitational pull that it became an inescapable fashion for 
clusters of people across the country.29 Not to suggest that the terrorists I encountered were 
good guys after all – they probably would have embraced violence and insurgency in society 
without the likes of al-Qaeda – but what I found is that that they were bad guys for none of 
the reasons I expected.  
 
Cross-Examining The Anecdotes 
 
For almost ten years, I have questioned whether my observations of terrorism’s 
driving causes had a broader application. I have wondered if the rationales I observed in the 
interrogation booth in Iraq might apply to terrorist recruits becoming “radicalized” in places 
further afield. Unquestionably, the circumstances in Iraq in 2007 were unique enough to 
produce a specific type of violent extremist, and yet I have become convinced that the 
motives for joining an avowed terrorist group can be consistent enough across time and 
space to produce some informative conclusions.  
To test my theory, I conducted research with some of the world’s leading CVE 
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interviewing, investigating, and interrogating terrorism suspects, most of whom have had 
direct interaction with terrorists during their careers. The objective in conducting the 
survey was to cross-examine my anecdotal evidence for the primacy of terrorism’s social 
causes by comparing it with the opinions of other professionals who have interfaced with 
terrorism suspects in various settings.  
The experts herein referenced have decades of combined experience interviewing 
and interrogating terrorism suspects in a range of contexts. From Ireland to Yemen, from 
Iraq to the United States, these experts have developed first-hand opinions about what 
drove their subjects to embrace terrorism, and, conversely, what would have kept them 
away from it in the first place. The diversity of experience was an experimental risk, insofar 
as inconsistent opinions were highly likely in such a setting. But I was pleasantly surprised 
to instead discover major consistencies, allowing generalizable conclusions to be drawn.  
First, I asked each participant to fill out a simple ranking survey (below). By way of 
context, I asked each participant to imagine a situation in which a prototypical “ISIL-
curious” individual, living outside the scope of the immediate battlefield (Iraq/Syria), was 
considering swearing an oath of allegiance to the group. Visualizing a moment of self-
reflection, I asked each participant to brainstorm a set of conditions that would prevent him 
or her from joining or rendering services to the terrorist group – influences that I herein 
refer to as “deterrent factors,” in contrast with “push and pull” factors that CVE scholars use 
to describe terrorist motivators.31  
Specifically, I asked my subjects to prioritize the nine factors listed below, by order 
of their potential for general deterrence, and that by bearing in mind the following 
questions: What factors would be most influential in dissuading a prospective ISIL-recruit 
from committing to join or otherwise render support to the group? What value(s) and/or 
realization(s) must that person possess, obtain, and/or maintain as requisites to sincerely 
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For purposes of categorization, I assigned one or more of the following classifications 
to each factor: political, economic, social, religious, or emotional. There is a degree of 
categorical overlap with some of the factors: “Responsibilities to immediate family,” as one 
example, could be an economic, social, or religious factor, depending on the respondent’s 
reading of the situation. That in mind, I asked each participant to elaborate orally on his 
interpretation of the ambiguous factors, and thus clarify which aspect of the factor (e.g. 
economic, political, social) drove him to prioritize it as such.  
I asked survey participants to rank the above factors from 1 to 9 in descending order 
of their deterrent strength. A rank of “1,” for instance, represents the strongest possible 
deterrent effect, while “9” indicates the weakest deterrent effect. A lower “average rank” 
indicates that factor’s greater deterrent strength.  
 
Results and Analysis 
 
In descending order, the following is a re-working of the original list with the average 
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As the results indicate, the deterrent factors that cluster towards the top of the list are 
disproportionately social factors. Following social factors are economic factors. Thereafter, 
political and emotional factors seem to be at near parity. Finally, and significantly, the 
trademark religious factor is dead last. 
To disentangle the first deterrent factor ranked above, I asked survey participants to 
clarify which type of family responsibilities would most effectively keep someone away from 
terrorism. Were they economic responsibilities (“My family needs my paycheck”)? Were 
they religious (“God commands me to be there for my family”)? Were they social (“I have an 
important family role to play”)? As it turns out, each participant’s narrative explanation 
showed a strong inclination toward the latter: Social responsibilities to the family, they 
claimed, would be most salient in deterring a candidate from joining a terrorist group. 
According to the experts, responsibilities to acculturate family members to social mores – by 
establishing and maintaining traditional family role-play – are stronger anchors than familial 
duties to be a breadwinner or moral guide. On average, in fact, survey participants 
considered these social responsibilities to the family as the single most influential deterrent 
factor. 
 The second factor ranked above is expressly social in nature. On average, survey 
participants ranked “Distance from/severing ties with those involved [in terrorism]” as the 
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utilize the infrastructure of existing social relationships. Peter Neumann, Director of the 
International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) summarized the process as 
follows: “The vast majority go [to fight] as part of clusters... A couple of them might go first, 
they stay in touch with each other, and one by one they pull their friends out there.”33 
Although recruitment is taking place in the fluid realm of cyber space, in other words, 
recruiters target very specific (and familiar) places on the ground, reaching out to people 
they already know from back home. The process is a two-way social transaction between 
familiar people, not a one-way religious or political brainwashing between strangers. Thus, 
disrupting the aforementioned social transaction is crucial in stemming the flow of new 
recruits. 
The factor ranked third – “Respect for the reputation of family/community” – is a 
social deterrent more so than a political deterrent, as explained by survey participants. In 
their view, the deterrent effect in having respect for family or community comes from a 
cultural obligation to reflect well on one’s place of origin. In societies where terrorism is 
exceptionally prevalent, family reputation is also a strong form of social currency. 
Safeguarding family status in those societies is a holistic, multi-generational effort involving 
all those who carry the family name. As a result, there is a strong acculturation not to 
dishonor the family’s reputation – to “steal from the family’s ’social savings account’,” as one 
participant described it – even when there exists a strong personal opposition to the family’s 
position on certain matters.34 Those who join terrorist groups in spite of the reputational risk 
to their families and communities likely see their identity-based social group as weak vis-à-
vis some other entity. In that case, the obligation to preserve the family’s or community’s 
good name – by pursuing a traditional, non-violent vocation, for example – loses its 
dissuasive power. Terrorism is far less socially risky in such a situation.   
Regarding the factor ranked fourth – “Newfound employment/Job opportunities” – 
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economic interpretation, and it would probably be ranked first if I had surveyed 
economists.35 However, the CVE experts who participated in my survey interpreted this 
factor differently. The value in getting a job, they suggested, is not the economic advantage 
it represents per se, but rather the opportunity it provides for developing social networks 
unaffiliated with terrorism. While not altogether insignificant, pay checks are a secondary 
benefit of gaining employment, according to CVE experts. “It would be more important,” 
one participant said, “for a guy to get a mechanic job, not because he would earn a good 
wage, or even because he would be distracted with work, but because he would be 
socializing every day with other mechanics.” What pushes people to embrace terrorism, 
according to this interpretation, is other human beings, not money or the lack thereof. And 
thus, opportunities to socialize represent the main deterrent utility even within the 
traditional economic interpretation of terrorism’s root causes. 
Towards the bottom of the list are the factors that are exclusively economic, 
emotional, political, and religious. For their part, the economic factors occupy a position 
right in the middle – they are more salient than political and religious factors, but not as 
pressing as social factors. There are two points worth noting here: First, that the most 
common solution to terrorism – democratic participation – ranks near the bottom of the list; 
and second, that challenging the terrorist message on dogmatic (religious) grounds is even 
less useful. According to CVE experts, neither political representation nor religious 
moderation are rudiments in curbing terrorism’s appeal.  
 
Towards a Sociological Interpretation 
 
The empirical results of the survey were not altogether surprising to this author, 
however the narratives I heard during follow-on interviews revealed an interesting nuance 
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terrorism as a socially centred phenomenon that starts positive – with joyous camaraderie, 
feelings of belonging, and the rallying around a common cause. But just as frequently, the 
process turns negative, when “the proverbial honeymoon comes to an end,” to quote one 
expert. Over time, there emerges a toxic peer-pressure to never defect, a development that 
often manifests in threats of violence and/or a sinister reminder that one’s very identity 
hinges on his or her ongoing commitment to the group. 
The actual point of transition from positive to negative social influences remains a 
mystery. I found no consensus within my panel of CVE experts as to when the process is 
likely to take place. One expert believes it occurs quite early, as recruits quickly realize “this 
is not what [they] signed up for.” Another expert pointed out that because all my survey 
participants (much like myself) have interacted with terrorists only after their detention, we 
are privy only to a post-hoc explanation of motive. For reasons of self-preservation, detained 
terrorists tend to minimize their personal complicity in the decision to join the group, 
instead emphasizing the intimidation they felt from others. Anecdotally I know this to be 
true. The positive social need originally satisfied by joining the group, then, might only 
transition to the negative in retrospect, or may be altogether insincere as it is with those who 
seek to minimize their role for legal reasons. It is difficult, therefore, to ever know exactly 
when (if ever) the negative social pressure to stay with the group actually overtakes the 
positive reasons for joining.  
Putting the nuance aside, there is one generalizable conclusion to be taken away 
from this essay. By and large, we can conclude, terrorist groups are popular because they 
provide people with a strong identity, a role to play, a proud affiliation, and an opportunity 
to share intimate experiences with others. A global terrorist profile is still a red herring, but 
by understanding terrorism’s appeal in sociological terms, we can better predict the 
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Taking all this into account, a vulnerable terror recruit is someone with no important 
social role to play in his/her family, someone who has ongoing contact with a current 
member of the terrorist group (usually by social media), someone with little regard for his or 
her family and/or community’s standing in greater society, and someone with no 
employment of the kind that would provide him or her an alternate social sphere. Typically, 
he or she will join the group in order to satisfy needs for social interaction, intimacy, and a 
sense of belonging and identity. At some point in his or her experience, however, reasons for 
staying with the group may transition from the positive (those just mentioned) to the 
negative (peer-pressure to stay). Regardless, he or she will emphasize the primacy of those 
negative social pressures when explaining his or her involvement to investigators after the 
fact. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
If it is the mission statement of CVE to “address behaviours that could potentially 
lead to terrorism,”37 I believe the quasi-profile outlined above offers a better understanding 
of those behaviours, and thus a better chance at countering them. Inevitably, politicians, 
journalists, and academics will critique this essay on the grounds that there can be no such 
thing as a terrorist profile, and that the actual reasons for terrorism’s appeal are hazy, 
dynamic, and vary greatly over time and space. Yet, while it is certainly true that what 
drives any particular individual to join or remain in a terrorist organization will be context-
dependent, and that overreliance on these kind of profiles can lead to adverse consequences 
– from discrimination and false positives to overlooking real threats that simply do not fit the 
model – these can be at least partially mitigated by focusing in on a particular group (such as 
al-Qaeda or ISIL) or a specific pool of potential recruits (such as foreign fighters).  
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provided that doing so inspires policy-makers to seek alternatives to religious, economic, and 
political solutions to terrorism. Up to now, the disproportionate emphasis since 9/11 on 
democracy, capitalism, and secularism as solutions for terrorism in the Middle East have 
been largely a product of the reality that everyone wants to find salience in their discipline: 
Economists want terrorism to be about unemployment, political scientists want it to be 
about dictatorship, and orientalists want it to be about Islam.38 For my part, I have found 
that the roots of terrorism’s appeal are primarily sociological – a fact that is all the more 
significant because neither I nor any of the experts I surveyed for this essay are sociologists.  
Research aimed at testing the primacy of social motivations for jihadist terrorism will 
likely corroborate this essay’s thesis. To that end, what is needed now is more research on 
social-based motivators for jihadist terrorism – research that applies rigorous methodology 
and produces much more nuanced empirical data than that presented in this essay. 
One such research project is being done by Quantum Communications, based in 
Lebanon. Their March 2015 white paper on terrorist motivators provides a much-needed 
disaggregation of terrorism motivations – by categorizing terrorists as “identity seekers” or 
“revenge seekers” or “ideologues,” for example – all based on an analysis of their word 
choice during interviews.39 The report was recently featured in an Atlantic article,40 and it 
was cited by U.S. assistant secretary of defence for special operations, Michael Lumpkin, as 
something that could help the U.S. Defence Department with counter-messaging and 
targeting.41  
As an investigative novelty, the Quantum report is an excellent launching point for 
further research. One compelling possibility is to examine terrorist motivations with 
geospatial analysis. The Quantum report makes a preliminary suggestion that motivations 
seem to fluctuate by proximity to the “jihad battlefield,” with more “identity seekers” 
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from places less far afield. Looking at motivations through a geospatial lens would help 
provide the nuance lacking in generalized reports about terrorism’s root causes, as well as 
provide a wholly different dimension to research done by the likes of John Horgan, who has 
examined the evolution of motivations within a single individual terrorist over time.42 
 In addition to blazing new trails in research, there is a dire need for more rigorous 
evaluation of socially-centred CVE policies that are currently in place. Hotlines in Europe, 
Canada, and Australia,43 as well as rehabilitation programs in Europe and the Middle 
East,44 are just two examples of ongoing initiatives that approach terrorism as a social 
phenomenon and attempt to counter it on those terms.  
Enabling family members of potential terrorist recruits to seek help from qualified 
intervention specialists via a hotline allows a family keep its affairs “in house,” and 
eliminates the need to choose between “betrayal” and outright inaction. Rather than putting 
further distance between an at-risk person and their most intimate social sphere, hotlines let 
responsible family members re-assert their authority, restore a beleaguered social bond, and 
mitigate long-term legal problems in the process. Some extremist rehabilitation programs, as 
another example, focus on the quieting effects of social intimacy and responsibility, and 
they aim to leverage social relationships for specific deterrence, as well for added 
surveillance.45  
Admittedly, both initiatives mentioned above still require a longitudinal evaluation 
of effectiveness in order to prove their viability, and that is no small task.46 It is this author’s 
strong belief, however, that such evaluations of these programs will confirm their 
effectiveness in the end.  
The success of terrorists in recruiting is no accident. Recruiters seem to know exactly 
what potential members are missing in their lives, and they likewise know how to provide it. 
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lonely and isolated individuals who seem to lack both.47 Poverty and piety have never been 
essential characteristics. It is therefore time to move on from the assumption that opening 
markets, providing jobs, and preaching the virtues of secularism will ever successfully 
counter violent extremism.  
There is certainly hope that despite the robust popularity of jihadist terrorism these 
days,48 understanding why people flock to join terrorist groups will allow policymakers to 
undermine their appeal in a significant and lasting manner. When CVE policies eventually 
start to respect the social causes of terrorism, young people who were once vulnerable to the 
charms of terrorist recruiters will find profound social satisfaction in other areas. Eventually, 
the likes of ISIL will go out of style as they succumb to the weight of their own brutality and 
hypocrisy. Policymakers, journalists, and academics, however, can surely expedite that 
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